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ABSTRACT
Nations around the world are considering strategies to mitigate the severe impacts of climate change
predicted to occur in the twenty-ﬁrst century. Many countries, however, lack the wealth, technology, and
government institutions to effectively cope with climate change. This study investigates the varying
degrees to which developing and developed nations will be exposed to changes in three key variables:
temperature, precipitation, and runoff. We use Geographic Information Systems (GIS) analysis to com-
pare current and future climate model predictions on a country level. We then compare our calculations
of climate change exposure for each nation to several metrics of political and economic well-being. Our
results indicate that the impacts of changes in precipitation and runoff are distributed relatively equally
between developed and developing nations. In contrast, we conﬁrm research suggesting that developing
nations will be affected far more severely by changes in temperature than developed nations. Our results
also suggest that this unequal impact will persist throughout the twenty-ﬁrst century. Our analysis
further indicates that the most signiﬁcant temperature changes will occur in politically unstable coun-
tries, creating an additional motivation for developed countries to actively engage with developing
nations on climate mitigation strategies.
INTRODUCTION
W
hile developed nations have historically emitted
far more greenhouse gases than developing na-
tions, the effects of global climate change are predicted to
be felt most severely by poor, developing nations.
1 There
are two primary reasons that developing countries will
be disproportionately affected by climate change. First,
developing nations may simply be exposed to more
damaging changes in climate as a result of their location
on the globe.
2 Second, their relative lack of infrastructure,
technology, and governance institutions may make
it more difﬁcult for developing countries to adapt to
changes in climate. Thus, the nations that are likely to see
the greatest impacts of climate change may also be the
least prepared to cope with the consequences of these
changes.
Recent research has examined differences in climate
change exposure between developed and developing
nations. Tol et al. note that poor countries tend to be
hotter, and thus agricultural and other economic activities
in these nations are closer to their upper temperature
tolerance.
3 Therefore, as temperature increases as a result
of global warming, the economies of poor countries near
the equator will be more severely affected. Tol predicts,
however, that this discrepancy will slowly decrease dur-
ing the next century as a result of more rapid warming at
high latitudes.
4 Research conducted by Yohe et al. further
examines exposure to climate change by using a model to
generate predictions for the degree to which each nation
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17will be affected by temperature change.
5 Yohe et al. ﬁnd
thatdevelopingcountrieswillbemoreseverelyaffectedby
climate change than developed nations when they con-
sider the aggregate impacts of warming. They note, how-
ever, that the effects of warming are predicted to be severe
for all nations if they calibrate their model to consider the
possibility of extreme weather events. A recent study by
Srinivasan et al. adds to the climate change exposure lit-
erature by comparing the exposure of nations to climate
changebynationalper-capitaincome.Srinivasanetal.ﬁnd
that poor nations bear far greater costs of climate change.
6
In addition to studying changes in temperature, re-
searchers have indicated signiﬁcant concern about the
effects of variations in precipitation and runoff on the
availability of water.
7 Milly et al. use an ensemble of
twelve climate models to predict a 10–40% increase in
runoff in equatorial Africa, northern North America and
northern Eurasia, along with a 10–30% decrease in runoff
in southern Africa, southern Europe, and the Middle
East.
8 Milly et al. note that such changes in regional runoff
could have severe effects on economic and individual
welfare. In contrast, Vorosmarty et al. predict that water
availability will be inﬂuenced less by changes in runoff
and precipitation due to climate change than by changes
in water demand resulting from population growth.
9
Climate change research has also focused on the ca-
pacity of different nations and regions to adapt to climate
change and what factors determine a particular area’s
vulnerability. Tol et al. stress the inﬂuence that gross
domestic product and per-capita income have on a na-
tion’s vulnerability to climate change, while noting that
equality and social welfare can also be important.
10 Kes-
kitalo and Kulyasova add that the effectiveness of local
and national governance is vital to successful adaptation
to climate change.
11 Seely et al. further suggest that suf-
ﬁcient technology is necessary for adapting to changes in
climate.
12 Brooks et al. use statistical analysis to investi-
gate which factors out of the many potential variables
mentioned in other research are most important in de-
termining vulnerability to climate change at the national
level. They ﬁnd eleven key indicators of climate change
vulnerability, including governmental, ﬁnancial, educa-
tional, and health statistics. Based on these indicators,
Brooks et al. suggest that countries located in Sub-
Saharan Africa are the most susceptible to climate change
impacts.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), which represents the consensus of hundreds of
prominent climate researchers, agrees that developing re-
gions are more vulnerable to climate change. The IPCC’s
most recent report, issued in 2007, notes that ‘‘there are
sharp differences across regions and those in the weakest
economic position are often the most vulnerable to climate
change.’’
13 The IPCC’s 2007 report also includes highly
robust predictions for climate change variables, represent-
ing the consensus of multiple climate models.
Despite the impressive body of research regarding both
vulnerability and exposure to climate change, no studies
have comprehensively compared these two factors at the
national level. Many studies, such as those conducted by
Milly et al. and Vorosmarty et al., focus primarily on ex-
posure, while those by Keskitalo and Kulyasova, Seely et
al., and Brooks et al. focus on vulnerability. The IPCC re-
ports extensively analyze both vulnerability and exposure,
but they examine these variables mainly at the global and
regional level. The modeling of climate change impacts
conducted by Yohe et al. incorporates measures of the
adaptive capacity of nations, a concept that is a major
component of climate change vulnerability.
14 Yohe et al.,
however, use their assessment of adaptive capacity to scale
the impacts of climate change exposure for particular
countries, instead of comparing exposure and vulnerabil-
ity. Srinivasan et al. and Tol et al. both directly compare
exposure and vulnerability in their research by relating
climate change and national income. However, they focus
exclusively on national income in their analyses.
This article seeks to extend existing research regarding
the distribution of climate change impacts by analyzing
the justice dimensions of climate change in a new way.
We use geospatial analysis to predict the effects of climate
change at the country level, and then determine whether
there is a correlation between the exposure of these na-
tions to climate change and their vulnerability as mea-
sured by a variety of social and economic factors. Thus,
we seek to determine if the countries that are the most
highly exposed are also the most vulnerable to climate
change. We also attempt to gain a broader understanding
5Gary Yohe et al., ‘‘A Synthetic Assessment of the Global
Distribution of Vulnerability to Climate Change from the IPCC
Perspective that Reﬂects Exposure and Adaptive Capacity,’’
(2006) <http://ciesin.columbia.edu/data/climate/>. (Last ac-
cessed on November 28, 2009).
6U.T. Srinivasan et al., ‘‘The Debt of Nations and the Dis-
tribution of Ecological Impacts From Human Activities,’’ Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (2008): 1768–1773.
7Charles J. Vorosmarty et al., ‘‘Global Water Resources: Vul-
nerability From Climate Change and Population Growth.’’ Sci-
ence 289 (2000): 284.
8P.C.D.Millyetal.,‘‘GlobalPatternofTrendsinStreamﬂowand
Water Availability in a Changing Climate,’’ Nature 438 (2005): 347.
9Charles J. Vorosmarty et al., ‘‘Global Water Resources: Vul-
nerability From Climate Change and Population Growth. Science
289 (2000): 284–288.
10Richard S.J. Tol et al., ‘‘Distributional Aspects of Climate
Change Impacts,’’ Global Environmental Change 14 (2004): 264–266.
11E. Carina H. Keskitalo and Antonina A. Kulyasova, ‘‘The
Role of Governance in Community Adaptation to Climate
Change,’’ Polar Research 28 (2009): 60–70.
12M. Seely et al., ‘‘Advances in Desertiﬁcation and Climate
Change Research: Are They Accessible for Application to En-
hance Adaptive Capacity?’’ Global and Planetary Change 64 (2008):
236–243.
13Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘‘Climate
Change 2007: Synthesis Report’’ (2007): 65.
14Gary Yohe et al., ‘‘A Synthetic Assessment of the Global
Distribution of Vulnerability to Climate Change from the IPCC
Perspective that Reﬂects Exposure and Adaptive Capacity,’’
(2006) <http://ciesin.columbia.edu/data/climate/>. (Last ac-
cessed on November 28, 2009).
18 MIRANDA ET AL.of potential differences in exposure among countries by
including precipitation and runoff variables in our anal-
ysis. Through our examination of precipitation and run-
off, we hope to elucidate whether vulnerable nations will
be more severely impacted by changes in water resources
than developed nations. Finally, we analyze climate
change predictions for multiple years throughout the
twenty-ﬁrst century to explore whether differences in the
impact of climate change in developed versus developing
nations converge or further diverge over time.
METHODS AND DATA
Estimating exposure to climate change
As the data substrate for our geospatial analysis, we
downloaded climate predictions generated from the
Community Climate System Model (CCSM), created by
the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR).
15
For three variables—surface temperature, runoff, and
precipitation—we obtained predictions for every month
in 2075 and every month in 2009 as a reference point, and
aggregated these monthly predictions into an annual av-
erage. For each of these three variables, we used predic-
tions that were based on the IPCC’s A1B emissions
scenario. All spatial data were imported into ArcGIS 9.2
(ESRI, Redlands, WA) for analysis.
We began our analysis by calculating the difference
between the 2009 predictions and 2075 predictions for
temperature, precipitation, and runoff. To compare this
predicted change in the variables for different countries,
we performed a spatial join between our model outputs
and a political map of the world. This join averaged the
values for each of the model output points that fell within
a country’s borders into a single value for that country.
Since the model data were formatted as a grid of points
covering the globe (see Figure 1, step 1), there were some
small countries for which we could not estimate a value
because no points were located inside their borders (see
Figure 1, Step 2). We addressed this problem for precip-
itation and temperature by creating a circular buffer
around each point in the grid (see Figure 1, step 3). We
then re-ran the spatial join, and each country intersected
at least one of the buffered areas, allowing us to generate
a value for every country (see Figure 1, step 4). Un-
fortunately, this same solution could not be applied for
runoff, as the runoff for each point in the ocean was zero,
which would cause our buffering system to calculate a
value of zero for island nations. We were thus forced to
exclude small countries from our analysis of predicted
change in runoff.
FIG. 1. Illustration of the steps used for generating country-level values of climate predictions.
15National Center for Atmospheric Research, ‘‘GIS Climate
Change Scenarios’’ (2009) <http://www.gisclimatechange.org/>
(Last accessed on November 18, 2009).
JUSTICE DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 19Scaling the effects of climate change exposure
Once we had calculated the average predicted change
in precipitation, runoff, and temperature, we interpreted
how these changes would affect different countries. For
runoff and precipitation, we began by calculating the
percent change in these variables for each country. We
used percent change to account for the fact that a small
change in runoff or precipitation would have a much
greater effect in arid regions than rainy ones. Using the
percent change in precipitation and runoff may exagger-
ate the uncertainty inherent in climate model predictions
for arid areas. Nevertheless, it serves as a more accurate
metric than absolute change for comparing the effects of
these variables between nations, since it takes into ac-
count the relative importance of precipitation and runoff
for each country. We then assumed that a percent increase
in these variables was linearly beneﬁcial to nations, and a
percent decrease was linearly harmful. This assumption is
certainly an oversimpliﬁcation, as increases in annual
precipitation and runoff can beneﬁt countries greatly by
providing water for human use, but they are also asso-
ciated with ﬂood risks, possible water contamination,
and shifts in seasonal runoff timing.
16 Unfortunately,
current climate models cannot accurately predict the
inﬂuences of these additional factors. Assessing the ef-
fects of precipitation and runoff on a linear scale thus
provides a reasonable estimate for the general impacts
of changes in these two variables on the welfare of
countries.
For temperature change, on the other hand, a linear
model is not applicable. For much of the world, increas-
ing temperature will have a host of negative effects in-
cluding heat waves, decreased crop productivity, and
spread of vector-borne diseases. Nations with cold aver-
age temperatures, however, may actually beneﬁt from
temperature increases that provide them with longer
growing seasons and milder winters. We therefore em-
ployed an inverted V-shaped curve for assessing the ef-
fects of temperature change, which designates increased
temperature as beneﬁcial up to an ‘‘optimum tempera-
ture,’’ above which increases are considered to have a
negative impact. Mendelsohn et al. show that agricultural
production follows an inverted U-shaped curve, with
output peaking at 11.7 degrees Celsius.
17 Nordhaus ex-
tends this principle to other economic sectors such as
industry, and shows that overall market output peaks
FIG. 2. Change from optimum temperature by country.
16Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘‘Climate
Change 2007: Synthesis Report’’ (2007): 49.
17William R. Cline, Global Warming and Agriculture: Impact Es-
timates by Country (Peterson Institute, 2007): 44.
20 MIRANDA ET AL.between 7 and 14 degrees Celsius.
18 We chose to use
Mendelsohn’s optimum temperature of 11.7 degrees for
our optimum temperature, and then used a ‘‘V-shaped’’
curve in which any increase in temperature above this
point was linearly detrimental and any increase below
this point was linearly beneﬁcial. Thus, an increase from
an average annual temperature of 12 degrees C to 13
degrees C would be assigned a value of  1 in our scale,
while an increase from 5 degrees to 6 degrees would be
given a value of þ1. Our focus on optimum temperature
ignores the fact that natural ecosystems are adapted to
the current climate of their location, and are thus likely to
be negatively affected by any change in temperature.
Since this study is focused primarily on the effects of
climate change on human welfare, the concept of an op-
timum temperature still represents a reasonable analytical
approximation.
Correlating exposure with vulnerability
To objectively compare climate change exposure to
each country’s political and economic well-being, we
calculated the correlations between each of our scaled
variables and ﬁve measures of vulnerability. First, we
used the Human Development Index (HDI), as calculated
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
The HDI comprises measures of life expectancy at birth,
educational attainment, and standard of living.
19 A
country’s HDI score is important to our study, as
healthier and wealthier (both ﬁnancially and in terms of
human capital) populations may be better equipped to
handle climate-related stresses.
Second, we used the UNDP’s technology achievement
index (TAI), which is designed to capture the achievement
of countries in creating and diffusing technology and
building human technological skills. The TAI combines
measures of technology creation, diffusion of recent in-
novations, diffusion of old innovations, and human
technological skills.
20 The TAI is explicitly not a measure
of national leadership in technology development, but
rather measures the extent to which the country as a
whole is participating in creating and using technology.
We included the TAI in our analysis since technological
capability will be vitally important to implementing the
changes that are necessary for adapting to climate change.
Third, we used the World Governance Indicators
(WGI), established by the World Bank to assess the
quality of governance and governments. The WGI include
measures of voice and accountability, political stability
and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regu-
latory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.
21 We
include the WGI as key measures of vulnerability as they
indicate how resilient countries may be to the ‘‘shocks’’
introduced by climate change.
Fourth and ﬁfth, we included two additional variables
that were not part of an indexed measurement, but
nonetheless contribute to a nation’s vulnerability to cli-
mate change. In order to account for the fact that nations
with a greater reliance on agriculture will be more se-
verely affected by climate change, we included the per-
cent contribution of agriculture to each nation’s GDP. We
obtained these data from the World Bank’s World De-
velopment Indicators.
22 To assess each country’s ability to
Table 1. Coefﬁcients of Correlation (r),
and p-Values for the Correlations between
Exposure and Vulnerability Metrics
2075 Temperature 2075 Precipitation 2075 Runoff
HDI
r 0.375  0.278  0.074
p <0.0001 0.0002 0.338
TAI
r 0.557 0.051 0.074
p <0.0001 0.675 0.540
WGI: Voice & Accountability
r 0.287  0.129  0.026
p <0.0001 0.076 0.720
WGI: Political Stability & Absence of Violence
r 0.319  0.097  0.048
p <0.0001 0.18 0.507
WGI: Government Effectiveness
r 0.364  0.124  0.011
p <0.0001 0.088 0.890
WGI: Regulatory Quality
r 0.321  0.163  0.030
p <0.0001 0.024 0.689
WGI: Rule of Law
r 0.359  0.076 0.008
p <0.0001 0.3 0.918
WGI: Control of Corruption
r 0.352  0.088 0.011
p <0.0001 0.229 0.885
Percent Contribution of Agriculture to GDP
r  0.219 0.200 0.080
p 0.002 0.006 0.279
Education and Health Spending per Capita
r 0.527  0.009 0.051
p <0.0001 0.903 0.491
18W. D. Nordhaus, ‘‘Geography and Macroeconomics: New
Data and New Findings,’’ Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America 103 (2006): 3510–3517.
19United Nations Development Programme, ‘‘Fighting Climate
Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World,’’ Human Devel-
opment Report 2007/2008 (2008).
20United Nations Development Programme, ‘‘Making New
Technologies Work for Human Development,’’ Human Develop-
ment Report 2001 (2001).
21World Bank Group, ‘‘Governance Matters 2009: The World
Governance Indicators Project,’’ (2009) <http://info.worldbank
.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>. (Last accessed on November
18, 2009).
22World Bank Group, ‘‘Quick Query: Selected from World
Development Indicators,’’ (2009) <http://ddp-ext.worldbank
.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method¼getMembers&userid¼
1&queryId¼135. (Last accessed on January 25, 2010).
JUSTICE DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 21provide assistance to their citizens coping with climate
change, we included per capita spending on health care
and education. For this measure, we downloaded data
regarding health and education spending from UNDP’s
Human Development Report and calculated the sum of
health and education spending per capita.
23
As an additional piece of analysis, we highlight the
predicted change in precipitation, runoff, and temperature
for Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) and Af-
rican nations. LICUS states are designated by the World
Bank as countries with extremely low per-capita income, as
well as weak institutions and governance. In order to be
considered LICUS, nations must have a per-capita income
within the threshold of International Development Asso-
ciation eligibility, and a governance rating of 3.0 or less on
the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional As-
sessment rating scale.
24 LICUS states and African nations
are both particularly vulnerable to climate change, as they
are low on multiple vulnerability metrics. For this reason,
in our results, we highlight LICUS and African nations
separately to determine how these two subsets of vulner-
able nations are affected by climate change. LICUS states
are important to examine for an additional reason: their
unstable government institutions could deteriorate if they
are badly impacted by climate change. Climate change in
LICUS states could thus be considered a national security
concern in addition to a justice issue. In fact, security
agencies and militaries around the world have already
started to view climate change in unstable countries as a
national security threat.
25
Examining trends for multiple years
After calculating correlations between the socioeco-
nomic measures and the climate variables for the change
between 2009 and 2075, we examined the change between
2009 and several other end years. We downloaded model
predictions for temperature in 2033, 2066, and 2099, and
correlated each of these predictions with the HDI. These
FIG. 3. Percent change in precipitation by country.
23United Nations Development Programme, ‘‘Indicators—
Human Development Report 2009,’’ (2009) <http://hdrstats
.undp.org/en/indicators/>. (Last accessed on January 25, 2010).
24World Bank Group, ‘‘Which Countries are Licus?’’ (2009)
<http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/licus06_map.html
#def>. (Last accessed on November 18, 2009).
25Dabelko, G.D., ‘‘Planning for Climate Change: the Security
Community’s Precautionary Principle,’’ Climatic Change 96 (2009):
13–21.
22 MIRANDA ET AL.correlations serve as an indicator of whether our ﬁndings
are stable for the twenty-ﬁrst century.
RESULTS
Temperature
In our analysis of temperature change, we ﬁnd that
most countries moved away from the assumed optimum
temperature of 11.7 degrees. Figure 2 shows that many of
these countries are located in South America, Africa, and
Southeast Asia. Most of the countries in these regions are
developing, and thus typically scored low on the WGI,
HDI, and TAI. Countries at high northern latitudes, in-
cluding the United States, Canada, Russia, and Northern
Europe, tended to beneﬁt from temperature change.
Despite a set of European and Middle Eastern nations
that were developed but moved away from optimum
temperature, we found a clear correlation between de-
veloping nations and detrimental temperature changes
(see Table 1). HDI, TAI, WGI, and spending on education
and healthcare all had a positive correlation with change
from optimum temperature, meaning that nations that
were more vulnerable moved away from optimum tem-
perature (all p<.0001). Percent contribution of agricul-
ture to GDP had a negative correlation with temperature
change, also indicating that vulnerable nations moved
away from optimum temperature (p¼.002).
Precipitation and runoff
Our maps for precipitation and runoff show a much
different picture than the maps for temperature. The av-
erage annual precipitation increased for most countries
between 2009 and 2075, providing a net beneﬁt to these
nations (see Figure 3). The change in average annual
runoff was also primarily positive, though not as consis-
tently as precipitation (see Figure 4). The distribution of
positive and negative effects was essentially random be-
tween nations, without clear regional trends. This ﬁnding
suggests that there is a relatively equal distribution of
impacts resulting from precipitation and runoff changes
between developed and developing nations.
The correlations between precipitation and runoff and
the vulnerability metrics were almost all insigniﬁcant (see
Table 1). Out of twenty of these correlations, only three,
the correlation between precipitation and HDI (p¼.0002),
the correlation between precipitation and WGI Reg-
ulatory Quality (p¼.024), and the correlation between
precipitation and percent contribution of agriculture to
FIG. 4. Percent change in runoff by country.
JUSTICE DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 23GDP (p¼.006), were statistically signiﬁcant. The ﬁrst
two of these correlations were both weakly negative,
indicating that countries with low HDI and WGI values
actually beneﬁt from precipitation change. The correlation
between precipitation and percent contribution of agri-
culture was weakly positive, indicating that nations with
a high dependence on agriculture also beneﬁt from pre-
cipitation change. Overall, there was little correlation be-
tween runoff and precipitation and national well-being,
as measured by our vulnerability metrics.
LICUS and African nations
In our analysis of LICUS and African nations, we found
that all of these vulnerable nations moved away from the
optimum temperature (see Figure 5). For precipitation, on
the other hand, more LICUS and African nations were
affected positively than negatively. The effects of runoff
were mixed, with approximately half of the LICUS and
African nations predicted to increase in runoff and the
other half predicted to decrease.
Temporal stability
We found that the correlation that we chose to examine
temporally, HDI and temperature, remained signiﬁcant
throughout the twenty-ﬁrst century (see Table 2). The p-
value for each correlation was <.0001, suggesting that the
relationship between HDI and the impacts of temperature
change will persist over this time span. Furthermore, in
additional analysis (not shown here), we regressed the
temperature changes in 2033, 2066, and 2099 on HDI in
three separate estimations. The regression coefﬁcient on
temperature increased from *1.7 in 2033 to *3.9 in 2099,
indicating that the gap in temperature effects between
low HDI and high HDI countries widens during the next
century.
DISCUSSION
The correlations between predicted temperature
change and our measures of vulnerability indicate that
developing nations do, in fact, face a higher degree of
exposure to negative impacts of temperature change. This
increased temperature burden on already vulnerable na-
tions could lead to crop failures, slowing of economic
development, and even political turmoil. The negative
effects of temperature change could lead to particularly
dire consequences for LICUS and African nations, all of
which move away from the optimum temperature be-
tween 2009 and 2075. In addition, our use of a ‘‘V-shaped’’
scale for temperature impacts may actually underestimate
increases in temperature for countries that are already far
warmer than optimum. If the impacts of temperature on
human welfare follow a true U-shaped curve, then very
warm nations will be affected even more severely by fu-
ture climate warming. Furthermore, our analysis of pre-
dicted temperature change for multiple time periods
suggests that the unequal distribution of temperature
impacts will persist over the next century. In fact, our
forecasted distribution actually becomes more disparate
moving from 2033 to 2099.
Our results for precipitation and runoff imply that the
effects of these variables on the welfare of nations will be
slightly positive as a whole, as the majority of nations are
predicted to increase in precipitation and runoff. The
distribution of precipitation and runoff effects is more
even than the distribution of temperature impacts. Only
three correlations in our analysis involving precipitation
were statistically signiﬁcant, and no correlations involv-
ing runoff were signiﬁcant. Furthermore, in the three
Table 2. Coefﬁcients of Correlation (r),
and p-Values for the Correlations between
HDI and Temperature for Multiple Years
2033 2066 2099
r 0.418 0.432 0.416
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
FIG. 5. Correlations with HDI focusing on LICUS and
African Nations. A. Change from optimum temperature
vs. HDI. B. Percent change in precipitation vs. HDI.C .
Percent change in runoff vs. HDI.
24 MIRANDA ET AL.precipitation correlations that were signiﬁcant, nations
low on HDI and WGI are actually predicted to become
better off. Nevertheless, our predictions for runoff and
precipitation change are not all positive; some countries
with pre-existing water issues are forecasted to decrease
in precipitation and runoff, such as Israel, Jordan, and
Syria in the Middle East. It is also important to note that
increases in temperature increase the rate of evapotrans-
piration, which can deplete water resources. While our
examination of change in runoff captures some of the
effect of increased temperature on evapotranspiration, it
is likely to underestimate the overall change in this vari-
able. Moreover, it is clearly an oversimpliﬁcation to as-
sume that increases in precipitation and runoff are
uniformly beneﬁcial, absent any consideration of rainfall
intensity or extreme weather events.
There are many variables not included in this study
that can affect both exposure and vulnerability to climate
change. In terms of exposure, changes in the prevalence of
extreme weather events such as heat waves or tropical
storms can have a greater impact on the welfare of
countries than changes in average annual temperature,
runoff, or precipitation.
26 Changes in the range of tropical
diseases, temporal distribution of rainfall, or number of
frost days can also have signiﬁcant effects on national
welfare. The three variables used in our analysis as
measures of climate change exposure are intended merely
to provide a broad, generalized assessment of climate
change impacts and to serve as a potential proxy for other
effects. In terms of vulnerability, additional factors that
can make a nation susceptible to climate change include
the availability of insurance and ﬁnancial lending, access
to improved water sources, and the prevalence of vector-
borne diseases. We did not include these vulnerability
factors because they were either unavailable as a single
quantiﬁable variable at the country level or they were
captured by another index used in this study.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis indicates that developing nations are
faced with both increased exposure to temperature
change and high vulnerability to global warming impacts
as measured by our vulnerability metrics: the human
development index, the technology achievement index,
the world governance indicators, percent contribution of
agriculture to GDP, and spending on healthcare and ed-
ucation per capita. This double threat to developing na-
tions is certainly an environmental justice issue, with
associated policy implications. As Jouni Paavola suggests,
developed nations might provide targeted aid to devel-
oping countries with the goal of improving their adaptive
capacity to climate change.
27 Such aid would help de-
veloping nations that may be unable to adapt to climate
change on their own to address the large impacts they are
predicted to receive. In some cases, it may even be in the
best interests of developed nations to provide climate
change assistance to developing nations for national se-
curity reasons. In particular, the fragile LICUS states,
which are all negatively impacted by temperature change,
are especially at risk for signiﬁcant upheaval associated
with climate change impacts.
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